Florida Appellate Court Clarifies ACV vs. RCV and Related Damages Evaluation in First-Party Property Cases

In Greenaker v. Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Co., Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal clarified the difference between actual cash value (ACV) and replacement cost value (RCV) valuations and reversed a final judgment entered in favor of the insurer before trial after the trial court excluded the insureds’ damages evidence through a motion in limine. The two main issues addressed by the opinion will shed light on how carriers approach property damage valuation under replacement cost policies and the procedural limits when seeking to exclude evidence of replacement cost damages where the repairs have not been completed.

The insureds alleged that their home sustained storm damage in 2020 and that the carrier breached the policy by failing to pay the full amount owed for the loss. The policy provided replacement cost coverage but stated that the insurer would “initially pay at least the actual cash value of the insured loss” and “then pay any remaining amounts necessary to perform such repairs as work is performed and expenses are incurred.” The insurer moved in limine to exclude all evidence of both RCV and ACV damages. The carrier argued that because repairs had not been completed, the insureds could not pursue RCV damages and were limited to ACV. The insurer also contended that the insureds did not produce evidence of ACV damages because their estimate was based on RCV for work not yet performed.

In response, the insureds filed a contractor estimate that included RCV, depreciation, and ACV calculations. The estimate also included labor-related costs, such as painting, floor protection, and detaching and resetting property. The trial court found that the estimate reflected RCV rather than ACV because “the work has not been done.” Accordingly, the trial court excluded the damages evidence and later entered final judgment for the insurer because the insureds could not prove damages at trial.

On appeal, the Second DCA clarified the interpretation of ACV and explained that ACV is not limited to the value of physically damaged property. Instead, the court focused on the distinction between depreciated and undepreciated loss values. Relying on the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Trinidad v. Florida Peninsula Insurance Co. and the Second DCA’s own earlier opinion in Goff v. State Farm Florida Insurance Co., the court explained that ACV is generally understood as replacement cost minus depreciation:

As replacement cost policies are intended to operate, following a loss, both actual cash value and the full replacement cost are determined. The difference between those figures is withheld as depreciation until the insured actually repairs or replaces the damaged structure.

[T]he term actual cash value does not serve to differentiate between what costs are incurred — that is, the rendering of services or the provision of physical materials — but rather how costs are valued — that is, what they could fetch on the market after depreciation versus the undepreciated cost necessary to replace all the value that the insured has lost.

The court did not agree that intangible costs (like labor, overhead, and related repair expenses) necessarily fall outside ACV. It reasoned that the policy’s loss settlement provision referred to the “actual cash value of the insured loss,” not just the value of damaged materials. The court also emphasized that the policy language did not support dividing costs into separate materials-only and labor-only categories. Rather, the distinction between ACV and RCV deals with valuation methodology — depreciated versus non-depreciated amounts — rather than which categories of costs could be included.

The court’s second holding focused on procedure rather than loss valuation. The court found that the trial judge effectively resolved a substantive damages issue through a motion in limine by determining that the insureds lacked legally sufficient proof of damages and entering judgment on the issue before trial. According to the court, that determination was the functional equivalent of a summary judgment ruling without following the procedural requirements of Florida’s summary judgment rule. Although the opinion noted that the insurer acknowledged during oral argument that the motion in limine had effectively been treated as a summary judgment motion, the opposing party did not consent to that procedure. Thus, the court concluded that the trial court improperly disposed of the claim through a motion in limine and reiterated that motions in limine are intended to prevent prejudicial or inadmissible evidence from being presented to the jury, not to dispose of claims before trial.

Ultimately, the court reversed the final judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. In sum, the opinion acknowledges that ACV and RCV disputes are policy-specific and fact-dependent, but it also demonstrates that Florida courts may look more closely at efforts to narrowly define ACV.